Recent decades have seen dramatic shifts in the regulation of industries away from traditional "command and control" strategies-based on fixed standards enforced by the state-and toward regulatory forms based on different social control strategies-like market mechanisms, the provision of information, and inforFor comments and discussions on earlier incarnations of this article, I thank
mal shaming processes. 1 Often, these are controlled by different types of actors as well-various types of private groups rather than government agencies. One regulatory form that rose to prominence in the 1990s is the private certification association. Here, nongovernmental associations certify companies on the basis of their social or environmental performance. These associations embody a new regulatory form that uses certification and the provision of information to address the impact of industry operations. Large-scale certification programs emerged across two otherwise very different industry contexts in the 1990s-the apparel industry, where certification associations focus on labor conditions and the problem of sweatshops, and the forest products industry, where they focus on environmental conditions and deforestation. This not only supports the image of certification as a general regulatory form but also raises questions about why it has emerged at these particular places and times.
This article explains why remarkably similar systems of private regulation have emerged in the apparel and forest products fields in North America. I use a comparative case study approach to examine the processes by which this distinctive set of institutional arrangements for regulating corporate activity was created. By identifying similarities across the trajectories of the two cases, I find two dynamics that explain the rise of private certification systems. One set of dynamics resulted from social movement campaigns that targeted companies-from demonstrations against Nike's labor practices in Indonesia to protests of Home Depot's sales of tropical timber. The other set of processes is linked to an international institutional context of neo-liberalism and free trade, which led both state and nonstate actors to support private, rather than public, forms of regulation. Rather than seeing certification and other "corporate social responsibility" initiatives as merely reflections of larger trends, I show specific ways in which social movement strategies and neo-liberal institutional arrangements led to the formation of private regulatory associations, rather than other solutions-like intergovernmental regulatory structures. Through this, I develop some more general ideas about the links between globalization, institutions, and the emergence of new regulatory forms.
The Rise of Certification Associations
Private certification programs emerged in both the apparel and forest products fields in the 1990s, as shown in Figure 1 , which is based on mentions of certification in selected trade journals. 2 Forest certification efforts took off somewhat more rapidly than labor standards certification, but both were rising to prominence in the mid-1990s.
By the end of the decade, there were three overarching forest certification programs and three overarching labor standards certification programs operating in North America. 3 The Forest Stewardship Council, Sustainable Forestry Initiative, and CSA-International address forest management, while the Fair Labor Associa-tion, Social Accountability International, and Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production focus on labor conditions. Through programs like the Forest Stewardship Council and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, firms like Home Depot and International Paper have had timber sources certified as "sustainable." Through initiatives like the Fair Labor Association and Social Accountability International, companies like Nike and Liz Claiborne have had contractors' factories in Latin America and Southeast Asia inspected by external monitors.
While quality and technical certification have existed for a long time-through Underwriters Laboratory, the "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval," and a variety of industry standards bodies-the use of certification to address the larger societal and ecological impacts of production processes is rather new. This form has emerged alongside a discourse of corporate social responsibility, a rise of partnerships between companies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and a range of experiments with corporate codes of conduct, sustainability reporting, eco-labeling, social auditing, independent monitoring, and Fair Trade products. At first, these trends may seem to be little more than responses to consumer demand or public relations ploys. But with closer attention, both of these images are lacking as explanations for certification programs. First, in contrast to the notion that certification and labeling initiatives are merely responses to the rise of socially and environmentally responsible consumerism, research on these programs suggests that stable markets for certified products rarely exist before the programs are begun-at least not at a scale that would warrant the amount of effort being put into these programs. Instead, making markets for certified products is part of a larger institution-building project that occurs along with the construction of certification associations. 4 Second, while it is tempting to reduce certification programs to nothing more than empty, corporate-sponsored public relations rhetoric-and clearly this is the case for some initiatives-this does not fit easily with the active role that credible environmental, labor, and human rights NGOs have taken in creating some of the earliest certification programs. Clearly, the rise of certification is tied up with larger political dynamics and is worthy of careful study. The research literature on certification programs-coming out of both academic and practitioner circles-overwhelmingly treats labor standards and forest certification separately. 5 Few have noticed the similarity in these two types of certification, 6 and none have systematically charted or explained that similarity. Yet labor standards certification and forest certification programs are remarkably alike-in form, function, and framing.
In both cases, certification associations are typically private, nonprofit organizations, made up of coalitions of companies and NGOs. For example, the board of the Fair Labor Association includes representatives of Liz Claiborne and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Social Accountability International includes Toys R Us and the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers' Federation. Home Depot and Greenpeace both participate in the Forest Stewardship Council, while Georgia-Pacific and Conservation International are affiliated with the Sustainable Forestry Initiative. These partnerships have led some observers to dub certification systems "the NGO-industrial complex." 7 Environmental and labor standards certification associations also carry out very similar activities. In both cases, associations set standards, accredit other organizations to inspect production sites and check companies' compliance with those standards, and then lend the name of the association, in some way, to companies that are found to be in compliance-sometimes through a product label.
Beyond their activities, there are striking similarities in the discourse surrounding labor standards and forest certification-as shown in the two quotations below. These two speakers work in different fields and have very different professional backgrounds. One is talking about forest certification and the other about labor standards certification.
You have to understand, this is a non-governmental approach to trying to solve a problem. And, to me, it's reflective of the complexities of doing business today . . . and of the world economy-that a lot of these problems are difficult to address by government action by legislation. And . . . something like [this association] is very interesting because it's a nongovernmental approach to solving what is really a public policy problem. 8 So much of trade is . . . such a massive, complex, dense network . . . that you could never set up a regulatory system that would cover it. . . . Compliance would be almost impossible. . . . There's no mechanism to establish that kind of international regulatory framework. So this is one that cut right to the chase and said "We're going to empower consumers to buy products that come from well-managed [sources] ." And this tool was very direct and very powerful and it was kind of captured everyone's imagination. 9 The first statement refers to labor standards, the second to forestry. Yet both talk about the purpose and significance of certification in similar ways-as a means for addressing problems posed by global supply chains that is more direct than government action.
In sum, quite similar systems of private regulation of have emerged in these two cases. This is surprising, considering that the politics of labor and the environment have historically tended to move on quite separate tracks. Furthermore, it suggests that something beyond industry-specific politics may be driving the rise of private certification as a new regulatory form. If so, then it should be possible to identify factors and processes that are operating across industries and that have helped bring about the rise of certification.
Toward an Explanation
Insights from institutional theories and research frame this study. Although a variety of different "institutionalisms" exist, institutionalists of a cultural, historical, or rational choice bent tend to agree on the importance of understanding the processes and mechanisms by which institutional arrangements are generated and change. 10 The emergence of institutions is a "bumpy" process, subject to a variety of political and organizational problems. 11 Building new institutions requires collective action and is thus plagued by problems of free-riding and defection. 12 Furthermore, the organizations that push or carry institutionalization projects may themselves fail, especially when resources are scarce or battles for legitimacy are particularly fierce. 13 It is by no means certain that the "right" institutions will always emerge to address a particular problem. Thus, instead of explaining new forms of private regulation by invoking their possible consequences (e.g., buffering global capitalism, facilitating flexible accumulation, shielding companies from criticism, etc.), I seek to explicate the process by which individual and collective actors built particular types of private regulatory programs, paying attention to the problems they encountered along the way.
Yet it is also important to remember that new organizational, regulatory, or institutional forms rarely emerge on their own but rather out of competition between alternative sets of solutions and conflicts between actors backing these. Drawing on this notion, my explanation of the initial emergence of private regulatory institutions will look at other possible ways of addressing labor and environmental problems and the factors that led certification to garner support from key players. This approach resonates with a larger move in institutional and organizational theory toward seeing potential institutional arrangements as objects of political contestation and strategic framing, moving beyond economic accounts of institutional emergence that view institutions as merely efficient solutions to problems 14 as well as cultural views of institutions as primarily symbolic structures that diffuse widely and are adopted for ritualistic reasons. 15 While emerging institutions are indeed products of strategic problem-solving activity, as well as some ritualistic borrowing and mimesis, they are best conceptualized as sets of practices that are in competition to become dominant institutions, in a field shaped by power, interests, and preexisting institutional arrangements.
ANALYTICAL APPROACH I use a comparative case study approach to look at the development of certification across two different fields-forest products and apparel. These are two important cases of private certification systems that address the impacts of industry operations, as opposed to certification of product quality and conformity to technical specifications. Currently, a number of nongovernmental programs use some form of certification or labeling in a way that addresses industry impactsincluding Fair Trade labeling programs for coffee, chocolate, and produce; international certification of organic foods; certification done by groups like the Marine Stewardship Council and Sustainable Agriculture Network; and others. Yet forest certification and labor standards certification make particularly good selections for comparative analysis for two main reasons.
First, these appear to be the first programs that have attempted to address the operation of entire industries, rather than building niche markets for products made through uncommon practices, as has been the strategy in organics and Fair Trade products. In this sense, forest certification and labor standards certification programs are attempting to be more "regulatory" than some other labeling efforts, although they clearly mix regulatory strategies with marketing ones. They are therefore highly relevant for building theories of private regulation and industry governance.
Second, apart from having private certification programs, the apparel and forest products fields are quite different from each other, in ways that provide analytical leverage for explaining the rise of certification. Analyzing these two cases is a version of what some comparative methodologists have called a "most different cases with a similar outcome" research design. 16 A partial solution to the problem of having too few cases and too many variables, the design rests on the argument that factors shared by two otherwise dissimilar cases are more likely to be causally relevant. 17 While these two industries are not the most different cases imaginable, they differ in at least two analytically important ways: For one, the central political problems in each industry-labor in one case, environment in the other-are different sorts of problems, not to mention historically segregated. 18 So making this comparison allows one to better understand certification as a general regulatory form, which may be filled with quite different contents. The second key difference between these two cases lays in the structure of production in each industry. Apparel production tends to occur through decentralized supply chains with multiple layers of contracting out. The production of forest products is much more likely to happen in a small number of large, vertically integrated firms that own land, harvest timber, produce lumber, operate pulp and paper plants, and sometimes even produce the chemicals for these processes, as with industry giants like International Paper. These differences make it surprising to find the same regulatory form in both industries, since industry structure greatly affects the potential of firms to engage in collective action to create or resist regulation. 19 On the whole, comparing forest and labor standards certification can provide a good deal of analytical leverage for understanding the rise of private regulatory systems. While a larger set of comparisons may also be helpful, this initial two-case comparison takes us far beyond the current norm of industry-specific case studies. 20 My analysis focuses on the early moments in the emergence of certification programs, to understand the ways in which regulatory options emerge and begin to get institutionalized. I pay attention to processes occurring over time and to sequences of events-taking, in effect, a historical approach to a contemporary issue. Inspired by evolutionary imageries and theories of path dependence, historical institutionalists have increasingly used the "branching tree" model as a framework for understanding the trajectories of economic and institutional change. 21 In this framework, the history of any organizational or institutional form is filled with alternate paths, roads not taken, and different possible outcomes. Furthermore, this style of analysis helps uncover the early elaboration and limitation of alternative models that occurs both historically and analytically before "lock-in" effects, path dependence, and diffusion take over. 22 With these goals in mind, the first step in my analytic strategy was, for each case, to examine the variety of options that actors considered, paying particular attention to "roads not taken." Since it is impossible to track all logically possible pathways, I focus on those policies, strategies, and other types of programs into which concerned groups and individuals poured substantial resources and energy. The goal was to understand why some options flourished while others fell apart or withered away. In other words, I looked at how paths that were at some point seen as promising got blocked off or came to be seen as no longer worth the effort. Next, I compared the narratives for each case, looking for similarities as a way of beginning to specify causally relevant factors.
I used three sources of data to develop the case studies. I collected a range of archival materials on certification programs, including charter documents, reports, internal memos, Web pages, and articles from trade journals. In addition, I drew on existing research (published and unpublished) on the industries, social movement campaigns, policy processes, and private regulatory initiatives. Most important, I conducted in-depth interviews with 37 key informants who had been entrepreneurs of labor and environmental certification and/or monitoring programs. I began with a list of core contacts, generated from public communications of certification associations and recommendations of other researchers of forest certification or labor monitoring/certification. From this initial set of contacts, I began interviewing and used snowball sampling to generate larger lists of potential informants. I focused in particular on getting interviews with individuals who had been involved in the creation of a certification program or its early stages of development. Interviews lasted between forty minutes and two hours, with a mean length of approximately seventy-five minutes. I was primarily interested in the information these individuals could provide about the organizations they had worked with, and a significant portion of each interview was spent reconstructing the histories of their programs, which provided extremely rich data for constructing the case studies.
Case Background
No single set of actors is responsible for creating certification initiatives. Instead, a number of actors-including states, social movements, NGOs, companies, and in the labor standards case, trade unions-have played roles at various moments. 23 Forest certification emerged as a response to campaigns about tropical deforestation and has so far focused primarily on wood products. The first overarching forest certification body was the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), founded in 1993. The initial impetus for this program came out of discussions in the early 1990s among the Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection, individuals with experience in community forestry in South America, and a few organizations that had recently begun to perform their own certifications of forest products. 24 As the idea grew into an organization, environmental groups such as World Wide Fund for Nature-or World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in the United States-and Greenpeace got involved, followed by a few companies, like the British home improvement retailer B&Q and Home Depot. 25 After the founding of the FSC, several industry groups put together their own certification programs, and battles over how to do certification ensued. This article focuses only on the moments leading up to the creation of the FSC, not on later developments. 26 Labor standards certification first emerged in the form of two associations, which were both being created around 1996-97-the Fair Labor Association (FLA, spawned by the Apparel Industry Partnership) and the Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA, later renamed Social Accountability International). The Apparel Industry Partnership was formed by the Clinton administration, which convened meetings with the Union of Needletrades Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE!) and a group of companies and NGOs. The Fair Labor Association emerged out of this group, with NGOs such as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), apparel manufacturers like Liz Claiborne, and the law firm of Arnold & Porter taking the lead. 27 The CEPAA was created by the Council on Economic Priorities (a socially responsible investment organization), with input from companies, some other NGOs, and the multinational certification firm Société Générale de Surveillance. 28 Additional labor standards certification and monitoring programs emerged within the next few years, and debates about the credibility of these programs raged. Here, however, my analysis focuses on the moments leading up to the formation of the FLA and the CEPAA, rather than on later events.
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Before turning to the explanation of the emergence of private regulatory programs, it is important to keep in mind some limits and potentials of these sorts of systems for fundamentally altering the conditions of workers and the natural environment. First, certification systems deal in reputation, which means they have the potential effect of "greenwashing" reality, or cleaning up corporate images without changing practices on the ground. In addition, these are privatized forms of regulation, so they potentially conflict with democratic ideals of openness and accountability. Since corporations typically play some role, whatever impacts these programs may have will likely be limited-although not necessarily unsubstantial. Furthermore, their impacts depend on the enforcement activity of external actors, like consumers, investors, suppliers, and so forth-without which they have little power. Yet even given these limitations, certification programs represent something significant on the global governance scene. At their best, they allow credible NGOs to "discipline" companies, temper corporate control of the certification process, and help solidify linkages between social movements/civil society in affluent countries and workers and forest-dependent communities in the global south. The emergence of private regulation may also eventually have unintended effects, for instance, by changing the structure of industries or shaping the strategies pursued by activist groups. Ultimately, the impact of certification may depend on who wins out in the competition to define and control this form-a competition that is as of yet unsettled.
GENERAL FINDINGS: COMMON THEMES ACROSS THE TWO CASES
Across these cases, two common themes explain why private systems for certifying companies have emerged in both the apparel and forest products fields. The first has to do with social movement pressure on companies. As I will show below, as environmental, labor, and human rights groups waged campaigns that targeted companies, it set in motion a series of battles between companies and their critics, which led to a demand for more credible and standardized systems for evaluating claims about the social or environmental impacts of industry operations. Actors on both sides expressed some interest in developing these sorts of systems, even though they usually disagreed on how such a system should work.
The second common element has to do with political action in a new global institutional context, dominated by neo-liberal agendas and rules about free trade. These "institutions of globalization" have affected the rise of certification in several ways. As I will show below, through interactions with these institutional structures, states and NGOs both turned toward private, nonstate solutions to problems of labor rights and forest management. This happened through two processes: as NGOs experienced repeated defeats in international arenas, they put more energy and resources into developing nongovernmental programs. In addition, in a context of free trade rules that limit direct state action, governments put money into private programs that were immune to rules about international trade. In fact, state support has been a critical factor in the rise of private certification associations, especially in the case of labor standards.
The next section of the article discusses each of these factors in more detail and shows how they operated in the two cases at hand. Rather than presenting a full case study for each field, I have organized this material around key analytic points.
Social Movement Pressure on Companies
In both the apparel and forest products fields, certification systems emerged in a context of social movement activity and public controversy about the social or environmental dimensions of the industry. As shown in Figure 2 , attention and discourse about tropical deforestation rose rapidly in the late 1980s and peaked around 1989. The graph shows mentions of the terms rainforests or deforestation in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times. 30 Similarly, labor standards certification systems emerged out of controversy over child labor and sweatshops. This peaked in the mid-1990s, as shown in Figure 3 , which charts the use of the terms child labor and sweatshops in these same media sources. Much of this attention resulted from two high-profile scandals. In 1995, inspectors discovered a slave-shop in El Monte, California, in which Thai immigrant workers were producing garments for the mainstream apparel market. The following year saw a scandal involving TV talk show host Kathie Lee Gifford, when labor rights groups spurred a media exposé showing that her line of clothes for Wal-Mart was being produced by child laborers in Honduras. While these trends illustrate the general context in which certification systems emerged, more specific forms of interaction between social movement groups and industry actors drove the creation of certification associations. 
Environmental Activism and Industry Responses
Environmental organizations like Friends of the Earth, the Rainforest Action Network, Greenpeace, and WWF were largely responsible for focusing attention on tropical deforestation. During the 1980s, environmental groups in Europe, and particularly Friends of the Earth in the United Kingdom, built sizeable campaigns to boycott tropical timber. 31 Similar campaigns emerged in the United States somewhat later, led by the Rainforest Action Network. Beyond encouraging individual consumer boycotts, environmental activists put direct pressure on companies involved in the timber trade. While tropical timber companies are rather small and not well-known to the public, environmentalists found a target in large do-it-yourself stores like B&Q in the United Kingdom and later Home Depot in the United States. These campaigns often publicly embarrassed companies, for instance, by filling the parking lots of home improvement stores with inflatable chainsaws.
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In response to boycotts, tropical timber exporting companies began making claims about the supposed environmental friendliness of their forest operations and products. They sometimes labeled their products with authoritative-sounding claims about sustainability and environmental protection. For instance, one Malaysian company's "Certificate of Products from Sustained Yield Management" said, "The hardwood rainforest products supplied come from wellmanaged production forests in accordance with the principle of sustained yield management thus safeguarding the environment and the ecological balance." 33 Exporting governments sometimes made supporting statements. Ghana's statement is instructive: "We confirm that all Ghanaian tropical hardwoods supplied by [company name] come from forest resources which are being managed to ensure a sustained yield of timber and other forest products in perpetuity and to arrest forest depletion and environmental degradation."
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Company claims making and attempts at self-certification spurred further criticism from environmental groups. In 1991, the WWF-UK issued a report showing that the vast majority of tropical timber firms' claims about their environmental friendliness could not even begin to be substantiated and called claims made by tropical timber trade associations "a remarkable mix of fact, conjecture and allusion together with a smokescreen of diverting but wholly irrelevant information."
35 This report became the cornerstone of a series of credibility battles, resulting in what one participant called "a confusing deluge of claims and counterclaims." 36 As one forester noted, "You might find one label which says 'We plant 10 million trees for every tree we cut down.' And you think, well, is that a good thing or a bad thing? And then somebody else says 'We buy our timber from only sustainably managed forests.' Well, you know, which product should I buy?" 37 In the environmental community, another observer recalled, "The problem was defined as proliferation of dubious claims, confusion in the marketplace, and no reliable mechanisms to leverage improvement for forest management." 38 Although companies' claims to environmental friendliness were certainly being contested in the environmental community, so were strategies of boycotting tropical timber. The boycott strategy came under fire for hurting forest-dependent populations in developing countries and for failing to stem the tide of deforestation. Some argued that boycotts devalued forest land, encouraged the conversion of forest land to agricultural uses, and thus had the unintended consequence of increasing deforestation. 39 In this context, environmental groups-including some who were endorsing boycotts-began experimenting with alternatives.
Friends of the Earth in the United Kingdom-one of the proponents of boycotts-began working on a system for recognizing environmentally preferable sources of timber. By 1988, this group had developed a "Good Wood Seal of Approval" and published its first Good Wood Guide. 40 (In the United States, the Rainforest Action Network followed a bit later, publishing the Wood User's Guide in 1991.) Yet soon the originators of these programs discovered that tracking wood products through complex supply chains was beyond their capacity.
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Friends of the Earth discontinued the Good Wood Seal in 1990. Other groups, like the Rainforest Alliance and Scientific Certification Systems, were beginning to put together their own independent certification initiatives in the late 1980s as well, and several of these groups would later help build an overarching association to standardize and oversee certification-the Forest Stewardship Council. 42 Tropical timber campaigns also led some wood products retailers to enter into partnerships with environmental NGOs. In 1990, WWF forged a partnership with the British home improvement retailer B&Q, and soon they were building a "buy-ers group," that is, a group of retailers that would commit to selling sustainably produced wood products. 43 By the next year, the "1995 Group" buyers group had formed, and approximately twelve members had committed to sell only "sustainable" wood products by 1995. 44 The important point here is that social movement pressure was spawning partnerships that put retailers like B&Q in a position to be potential supporters of a certification system that had yet to be developed.
In sum, as social movement organizations put pressure on tropical timber producers and retailers, this created a demand for a more overarching system for evaluating claims about forest management, harvesting practices, and the use of the infamously ambiguous term "sustainability." In fact, environmental groups and a few companies were both expressing some interest in a larger system that could establish the credibility of some claims and discredit others.
Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns and Industry Responses
Throughout the 1980s, activists in the global South had led campaigns against bonded child labor, and unions and immigrant groups had waged campaigns against sweatshops in the United States. Yet the most visible anti-sweatshop campaigns emerged in the early to mid-1990s. In 1992, the NBC TV show Dateline broadcast an exposé on children making clothes in Bangladesh for Wal-Mart. 45 Companies like Nike and The Gap were soon under fire for their outsourced operations in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Groups like the National Labor Committee, Global Exchange, Campaign for Labor Rights, and garment workers unions have been responsible for mounting most of these campaigns. In general, they have tended to target companies rather than governments and have attempted to leverage negative publicity about image-conscious companies with recognizable brand identities.
As companies were faced with media exposés, protests at their stores, and shareholder resolutions, they often responded by adopting corporate codes of conduct that addressed working conditions in the factories of their contractors or subcontractors. 46 In 1992, Levi Strauss developed one of the first corporate codes of conduct to lay out specific labor standards for the company's contractors. 47 By the mid to late-1990s, statements about working conditions, occupational health and safety, child labor, and wage levels were common in corporate codes of conduct, and a number of major apparel manufacturers and retailers had adopted codes. 48 Yet corporate codes of conduct themselves soon came under contention, as social movement groups charged that they were merely symbolic documents, completely detached from realities "on the ground" in factories. Activists exposed the public relations qualities of codes by showing, for instance, that they were often not posted in workers' native languages. 49 In attempts to "verify" their codes, companies became more likely to bring outsiders in to inspect or "monitor" factory conditions. This led to a series of experiments with factory monitoring. These experiments took several forms, and indeed the character of the monitoring soon became a subject of intense debate between industry actors and their critics.
Some of the earliest questions about monitoring arose out of campaigns against child labor in the production of soccer balls in Pakistan and garments in Bangladesh. 50 Conflicts over plans for monitoring factories foreshadowed a number of debates about the uses of monitoring and meaning of "independent monitoring." While companies' initial conception of monitoring was to send agents of the company to inspect contractors'factories, a competing conception arose out of the National Labor Committee's campaign against The Gap. Leaders of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility helped broker an agreement between The Gap and the National Labor Committee, which included a provision for independent monitoring of a Salvadoran factory and brought a number of actors together to consider the meaning and purpose of "independent monitoring." As a result of these discussions, in 1995 several Salvadoran religious and human rights leaders helped to form the Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente de El Salvador to inspect factories for The Gap. 51 This experiment ultimately left both companies and critics unsatisfied, but nevertheless paved the road for intense debates about the credibility of monitoring. It is also worth noting that additional independent monitoring organizations, like Verité and Coverco, were emerging at this point as well.
Debates about monitoring came to a head in controversies surrounding Nike. To counter the claims of its critics, the company commissioned monitoring visits by the accounting firm Ernst & Young (and later Price Waterhouse). 52 Yet a review of a leaked Ernst & Young report on a factory in Vietnam criticized the auditors' methodology and narrow focus and revealed conclusions like "There's a high rate of labor accidents caused by carelessness of employees." 53 Nike also came under fire for a supposedly "independent" audit it had commissioned in early 1997 by Andrew Young, a former civil rights activist and UN Ambassador. 54 A New Republic article exposed numerous flaws in Young's report, including a picture of Nike employees misrepresenting themselves as trade union representatives. 55 In sum, continued social movement pressure-pressure that focused on the way companies tried to monitor compliance with codes of conduct-raised a number of questions about the role of monitoring and who should be doing it. In other words, social movement activity delegitimated companies' first-choice solutions, like codes of conduct, marketing campaigns, and internal monitoringat least as solutions on their own. This created some underlying demand for a more credible system for evaluating factory conditions-a demand that seems to have been shared by at least some members of both the corporate and activist communities.
Political Action under Neo-Liberalizing Institutions, Part 1: State Support for Private Regulatory Programs
A second theme found in both cases has to do with political action occurring in a context of neo-liberal institutional arrangements associated with globalization. This context shaped the action of states, social movement groups, and NGOs in such a way as to help shift their efforts and resources to a path toward private forms of regulation, as opposed to governmental or intergovernmental regulatory systems. I begin by showing how states came to support private certification initiatives. Later, I examine the ways in which experiences in international institutional arenas led labor and environmental NGOs to increasingly turn toward private solutions, like independent monitoring/certification.
In both fields, private certification systems emerged as state action got directed toward private forms of regulation, rather than governmental or intergovernmental systems. This happened, in part, because of states' interactions with institutions and ideologies of free trade and neo-liberalism. In the forestry case, rules about free trade severely limited the possibilities for governmental action and indirectly facilitated the rise of a private alternative. In the case of labor standards, governmental action gave rise to private certification systems in two main waysone through the activities of U.S. government officials and another through the defeat of a proposal for an intergovernmental certification program. 56 Although government support was crucial to the rise of both forest certification and labor standards certification, government actors played more direct roles in the latter case, as will become clear in the discussion of U.S. Department of Labor initiatives.
Tropical Timber Bans and the Impact of Free Trade Rules
In the 1980s and 1990s, a variety of legislative bodies, under pressure from environmental groups, passed policies intended to slow the rate of tropical deforestation. Hundreds of European cities, a few American cities and states, and several European countries moved to ban imports of tropical timber in the early 1990s. 57 This trend of legislative bans led to a pivotal moment in the regulation of international forestry.
This came in 1992, when the Austrian parliament voted to ban the import of tropical timber unless it could be labeled as sustainably produced. 58 Tropical timber exporting countries like Indonesia and Malaysia charged that this amounted to a nontariff barrier to trade and threatened to challenge the law under the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1993, the Austrian government backed down and revised the law. 59 This had two very important effects. First, it established that governmental action on tropical timber imports was vulnerable to challenge under global free trade rules, thus discouraging other governments from taking this route. As Crossley argues, "Importing countries have generally taken heed of the pitfalls encountered by the Austrian approach and moved away from using mandatory, legislative means to address timber trade issues. It has become clear that they are likely to be GATT-illegal and subject to challenges under the World Trade Organization (WTO)." 60 Second, when the Austrian government backed away from requiring labels for tropical timber, it took the money allocated for that project and funneled it into a private labeling program-the emerging FSC. As one observer recalls, "WWF-Austria managed to persuade the Austrian government to use that project money to support FSC. . . . That was a major area of funding [for the FSC] for certainly the first two years." 61 The Swiss, Dutch, British, and Mexican governments also made financial contributions early on, and government aid agencies have continued to provide some funding. 62 So this is a situation in which the interaction between state policy and free trade rules helped a private regulatory program get off the ground in very concrete ways.
From Governmental to Private Action on Labor Standards Enforcement
Labor standards certification emerged out of a similar set of dynamics, in which the state provided material and moral support for private forms of regulation as ways of addressing sweatshops in the United States and abroad. Although labor standards certification programs focus largely on international labor conditions, some of their origins lay in attempts to enforce U.S. labor law in the Los Angeles apparel industry. In fact, it was here that the practice of using private organizations to regularly "monitor" labor conditions in garment factories began.
U.S. Department of Labor officials had struggled to enforce wage and hour laws in the highly mobile and decentralized garment industry for decades. 63 In the early 1990s, officials in the Wage and Hour division of the Department of Labor offices in Los Angeles came up with an innovative solution. Under the "Hot Goods" provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the government could seize products made in violation of wage and hour laws to keep them out of interstate commerce. A Labor Department official explains, "We really . . . felt we needed somebody else helping to monitor what was going on. So we dusted off this 1938 statute of Hot Goods and set up a program where we could use it administratively instead of only in a legal setting." 64 In an industry that puts a premium on speed to the market, the seizure of goods, even if only temporarily, could be very damaging.
Yet the Department of Labor's capacity to inspect factories had diminished greatly over the previous decades. The ratio of labor inspectors to total U.S. workers went from 1:46,000 in the early 1970s to 1:130,000 in 1992, and continued to fall during a hiring freeze in the early 1990s. 65 Given its diminished enforcement capacity, the Department of Labor developed a "compliance agreement " in which a manufacturer agreed to pay back-wages owed to workers and monitor its contractors' factories. The first compliance agreement was signed by Guess in 1992.
By mid-1993, about twenty full compliance agreements had been signed in California, and the program was spreading to New York City. 66 A Department of Labor official described some of the results of the program: "I had Polo Ralph Lauren giving me a $120,000 check to shut up and get out. You know, I had Calvin Klein writing a $35,000 check on the spot, [saying] 'Please do not go to the media with this.'" 67 At first, manufacturers asked quality control personnel to take on labor monitoring duties, but soon a new private monitoring industry arose in Los Angeles and New York City, with monitors sometimes coming from the ranks of former garment contractors and Department of Labor inspectors. 68 The monitoring industry continued to grow through the mid-1990s, and by 1998, private monitors in southern California were conducting somewhere around 10,000 inspections per year. 69 Several of these monitors were later accredited by the Fair Labor Association. So this is a case of declining state capacity and state support for private programs creating the organizational foundation for a larger system of private regulation.
In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration got involved, adding experiments with publicity to this monitoring program, in the view that publicizing the best and worst companies would have a positive impact on working conditions industrywide. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich was particularly active on this, partly in response to pressure from the garment workers' union, UNITE! In 1995, Reich developed a "Trendsetters List," which used positive publicity to recognize manufacturers that were monitoring their contractors. Several companies quickly criticized the list, in part because it lacked any consistent basis for adding or removing companies, and this primitive proto-certification program was abandoned within a few years. 70 The Department of Labor also used negative publicity strategies, by publishing the names of manufacturers and retailers using contractors that had been cited for violations of wage and hour laws. 71 As these experiments floundered, Reich pursued two different avenues for using publicity to address sweatshop issues-one a private group, the other an existing international organization.
In July 1996, Reich convened the Fashion Industry Forum, a meeting with apparel manufacturers and retailers. Participants discussed several options, including company self-monitoring, external monitoring, and the development of a "no sweat" labeling program. 72 Later that year, President Clinton and Secretary Reich brought together twenty-three representatives of apparel companies, labor unions, and NGOs, in what would later be called the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). The companies included many that had been on the Trendsetters list as well as social movement targets such as Nike and Liz Claiborne. 73 Representatives from the AFL-CIO and UNITE! were also present, as were NGOs like the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Business for Social Responsibility, and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. In the early AIP discussions, Reich had pushed for the group to develop a "no sweat" label for garments, but companies were sometimes resistant to the idea and there was little movement in this direction. 74 Much of the early work of the AIP was focused on producing a workplace code of conduct that member companies would agree to.
Also in mid-1996, Reich proposed to the International Labor Organization (ILO) that it consider developing a system for labeling garments based on the labor conditions in which they are made. A report in Women's Wear Daily foreshadowed ensuing difficulties, citing concerns about abuses of labeling systems for political and trade-related purposes. 75 The ILO considered a proposal for a "global social label" the next year. 76 This was a modified version of the proposal made by Reich, although the ILO proposed to certify entire countries rather than specific companies. 77 When the proposal was discussed at the ILO conference in June of 1997, representatives of developing countries-led by Egypt-attacked the social labeling proposal as a disguised form of protectionism and charged the ILO with trying to become a trade organization. 78 The social labeling proposal seems to have died right there. Yet another reform proposal, to make the ILO core labor standards mandatory for all ILO members, passed the following year.
79 So while one reform effort in the ILO had succeeded, the opportunity for a labeling/ certification systems administered by an existing international organization had been effectively shut down.
It was in this context that private programs for certifying companies began to solidify. After the creation of the AIP, two groups had begun creating systems to monitor factories and certify companies. The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was a direct extension of the AIP and was officially founded in 1998 as the monitoring and certification wing of the AIP. Another group, the CEPAA, was also created just after the formation of the AIP, in part in hopes of carrying out certification for the AIP 80 as well as to standardize other existing social auditing efforts.
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Although this group did not end up working under the AIP, it released its own Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) standard for factories and built its own certification program, later changing its name to Social Accountability International. The U.S. government provided financial support to both programs. In 1999, the Clinton administration allocated $4 million a year to supporting NGOs working on global labor standards issues and set up a grant to be administered by the U.S. State Department and the Agency for International Development. The FLA received grants in its early years, receiving close to $650,000 in 2000 and $750,000 the next year.
82 Social Accountability International also received funding from this grant. 83 While companies, foundations, and other organizations also made financial contributions, the State Department grants make up a majority of each association's budget. 84 Thus, with international arenas unresponsive to labor standards, the Clinton administration put substantial energy and resources into creating private alternatives. In some situations, the Clinton administration seems to have shifted to private arenas as a response to these institutional arrangements, but this administration's actions also helped strengthen neo-liberal agendas. In any case, it was out of the interaction between states and neo-liberal institutions that private labor standards certification systems emerged.
In sum, government support played a critical role in the rise of certification of both forests and factories. Furthermore, it was international institutional arrangements that led governments to put money into private forms of regulation, in part because these private systems were not subject to rules about "non-tariff barriers to trade."
Political Action under Neo-Liberalizing Institutions, Part 2: NGO Campaigns and the Turn Toward Private Alternatives
In both the labor and environmental cases, experiences in intergovernmental arenas led NGOs and social movement groups to put more energy into private, nongovernmental approaches to labor and environmental issues, as they became increasingly discouraged and disenchanted with governmental and intergovernmental approaches. This helps explain how some NGOs became key players in the development of certification associations.
International Forestry Campaigns and the Defeat of Governmental Solutions
Environmental groups had several specific experiences with failures and defeats in intergovernmental arenas. During the 1980s and 1990s, environmentalists made a number of attempts to embed forest management standards in existing international organizations. Yet as several notable campaigns got shut down, environmental groups recognized an increasingly dismal set of opportunities for intergovernmental action and began constructing nongovernmental regulatory programs.
In the late 1980s, Friends of the Earth in the United Kingdom proposed creating an international forest certification system under the auspices of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), a preexisting international trade organization, which had governments as members. 85 The environmental group convinced the UK Overseas Development Administration to submit the proposal to the ITTO at its 1989 meeting. Although it asked only for study of the issue, the proposal spurred a great deal of controversy and was attacked, particularly by timber-exporting countries. 86 As one Friends of the Earth campaigner said,
We thought that the ITTO could at least-through the project that we proposed-investigate the feasibility of certification. And this might be a way of kind of gently easing into the ITTO system what was really quite an innovative and potentially quite contentious subject. And as it turned out, even the consideration of the feasibility of it turned out to be too contentious. 87 Timber exporting countries argued that since similar organizations did not exist for nontropical forests (temperate or boreal), certification would constitute a trade barrier and would impinge on their sovereignty. 88 Discussions about the proposal were mired in North-South conflicts, industry resistance, and questions about the compatibility of certification with free trade agreements like GATT.
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In the face of this opposition, the UK government weakened the proposal, and the ITTO agreed to commission a study on the general topic of how market incentives could improve forest management. 90 For environmental groups like Friends of the Earth, this was already a defeat. One participant from the NGO community went on the record at the 1989 meeting to say that the results of the certification discussion had "reduced the original Pre-Project Proposal by United Kingdom on labeling systems to an insignificant study." 91 In the following years, the ITTO continued to study certification, and even endorsed it, but never again considered actually administering an inter-governmental certification system.
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The failure of the ITTO to act decisively on the enforcement and verification of forestry standards fueled the formation of a private certification system. The first meetings of what was to become the Forest Stewardship Council were occurring in late 1990, and in a 1991 report, the WWF explicitly framed the emerging FSC as an alternative to failed intergovernmental programs, referring to "leaving the ITTO behind." 93 As one FSC employee put it, "FSC was a response to the failure of international organizations that ought to have had the remit to enforce, to implement and develop good forestry standards-ITTO in particular. . . . And FSC was set up to correct that failure." 94 So the ITTO affair is an example of both a "road not taken" in the emergence of certification and an instance in which environmental groups got an object lesson of sorts on the politics of free trade and began to frame nongovernmental programs as alternatives.
Forestry campaigners' frustration with intergovernmental arenas intensified in the following years, after the 1992 United Nations Commission on Environment and Development (UNCED) "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro. Going in to the meeting, some environmental groups thought the summit had the potential to produce a binding international agreement on forest management. But the idea of a global forest convention was crushed in preconference meetings, "initially vetoed by the Malaysian government but unmourned by many other states," including those worried about revenues that would be lost to forest conservation. 95 Instead of producing a binding international convention, the Earth Summit resulted in a vague set of non-binding guidelines, known as the Forest Principles, as well as an overall guidance document known as Agenda 21. 96 Environmental groups viewed Rio as a nearly complete failure on forestry issues and began devoting even more of their energies and resources to private alternatives. One observer explained that environmentalists were especially disappointed because "there were expectations created. People were certainly upset before. . . . But it reached heightened proportions, unprecedented proportions, post-Rio-because the expectations were so high." 97 Some environmental groups became especially disenchanted with intergovernmental areas at this point, and seem to have interpreted Rio as one more piece of evidence that private rather than intergovernmental, initiatives were the place to focus their energies. This seems especially the case for WWF. One former WWF official explained that governments had proven too slow and intergovernmental arenas had proven too easily subject to veto. 98 In an influential 1993 report, Johnson and Cabarle reviewed attempts to work through institutions like the ITTO and UNCED and argued that these and other emerging "official" international forums are crucial for negotiating, designing, and enacting the land-use and economic policies needed to make forest management more sustainable and to get it practiced on an appreciable scale. However, if past experiences with international forestry efforts are any guide, these forums will offer little substantive guidance on how to define and implement more sustainable forest practices locally. The timber-certification movement is critical to filling that gap. 99 After Rio, WWF put a great deal of time and money into an emerging private, nongovernmental program-the FSC. While the earliest work on the FSC came from other sources, by the October 1993 founding conference, a number of WWF representatives were involved, some in key leadership positions. 100 Representatives from WWF took a leading role in developing the FSC from a concept into an organization and contributed significant resources to the project. As one participant in this process said, "There were a lot of actors that played different roles at different times. But clearly WWF was front and center for all effective purposes. It was the incubator and the surrogate mother, so to speak, for the FSC."
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International Labor Standards Campaigns and the Obstacles to Government Action A similar dynamic occurred in the case of labor regulation, after several failures to get international labor standards embedded in multilateral trade agreements. It was in the wake of these defeats that some labor rights NGOs turned toward other solutions-like independent monitoring of factories and certification programs of various sorts.
In 1994, leaders of the ILRF published an article in Foreign Policy calling for a "global New Deal." 102 While the increased scope of capital certainly made the establishment of a global welfare state an uphill battle, the ILRF and others saw some possibilities for embedding social standards in multilateral trade agreements that were being negotiated at the time. Within the next two years, however, this potential would be blocked repeatedly, leaving reformers frustrated.
As the Uruguay round of negotiations of GATT approached in 1994, labor activists redoubled efforts to add a "social clause" to GATT, to be enforced by its new administrative branch, the World Trade Organization. 103 The focus was on the ILO's core labor standards rather than wage standards, in order to avoid the strongest charges of protectionism. 104 Even so, GATT negotiators rebuffed this campaign at the Uruguay meetings of 1994 and refused to even recognize a legitimate link between international trade and labor standards.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was also being negotiated during this period. Although U.S. President Bill Clinton had promised not to sign NAFTA unless it included labor and environmental protections, he ended up signing the agreement with only weak labor "side agreements," the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The NAALC formally covers a range of labor rights, but it does not protect all rights equally. Freedom of association, for instance, is considered a lower tier standard, in effect making the process of filing a complaint and getting a decision even lengthier than for other standards. 105 So by the mid-1990s, labor groups had experienced several notable failures in intergovernmental arenas and were becoming increasingly discouraged about the prospects for effective governmental action. 106 As one labor rights professional explained, "I would say that it's taken for granted that, as of 1996-or even 2002-government action is not forthcoming. I don't take it for granted that government action is not possible, I just think . . . it's not gonna happen." Another suggested that given the failure of unionization and law enforcement, "It seemed like we needed to add consumer pressure to legal, diplomatic, and trade pressures. And so it became not a choice of either this or that, but an additional weapon in the arsenal for human rights."
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In this context, a group like the ILRF, which had been at the center of these campaigns, began focusing more on private strategies-like independent monitoring of factories and nongovernmental certification programs. The National Labor Committee, while not a supporter of certification, championed the use of "independent monitoring" of factories-a precursor of sorts to certification systems. 108 The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, which had been at the center of experiments with independent monitoring, also contributed to building a larger certification program. This is not to say that public and private programs were seen as mutually exclusive, but groups now poured significant resources into creating and supporting nongovernmental regulatory tools, like independent monitoring and certification. Labor rights groups continued to campaign for labor standards and a "social clause" in the WTO, but this proposal was again defeated at the Singapore meeting of the WTO in late 1996 and early 1997. 109 Thus, in the cases of both labor and the environment, as NGOs and social movement organizations experienced failures in intergovernmental arenas-arenas in which neo-liberal free trade agendas were becoming dominant and social and environmental standards were increasingly seen as barriers to trade-they tended to shift their energies and resources toward private alternatives. Some groups even became the "institutional entrepreneurs" for certification, forging fragile coalitions with companies to construct new associations and to standardize practices of monitoring, social/environmental auditing, and certification.
Points of Comparison in the Emergence of Forest and Labor Standards Certification
Certification of both forests and factories emerged through a politically contested process, in which activists, governments, and companies pursued number of different strategies, and a number failed or were defeated. By charting these options, my analysis has helped draw out the process by which a new regulatory form emerged, rather than seeing it as inevitable or automatic. Interestingly, the failure or defeat of some strategies (like intergovernmental regulation) helped facilitate the rise of private certification.
Specifically, in both cases, certification systems were in part a response to social movement pressures, which created a demand for some way of evaluating companies' claims about their social and environmental impacts. At times, both companies and their critics called for higher level, standardized programs to do something like certification, although they usually disagreed about how such programs should work.
But the emergence of certification associations was conditioned by a series of conflicts that resulted in both states and NGOs channeling resources into a private form of regulation. First, as governmental and intergovernmental options for addressing labor and environmental issues were blocked or failed, NGOs and social movement groups put more energy and resources into nongovernmental programs-like nascent certification and monitoring efforts. In addition, as direct state involvement became illegitimate or prohibited, states shifted to private solutions-and funded certification systems at crucial early moments. Sometimes government actors even helped organize private certification associations. This all occurred in a context in which governmental and intergovernmental programs were stifled by neo-liberal ideologies and institutions, which, at the least, tended to legitimate claims that social and environmental standards were little more than barriers to trade, and sometimes constrained action directly. Yet out of the failure of governmental and intergovernmental programs grew the material and rhetorical resources for the construction of private alternatives.
These similarities in the development of certification associations in the apparel and forest products fields go a long way in explaining the rise of certification as a regulatory form. But it is also instructive to consider a few differences between the cases. First, governments played different roles in supporting certification initiatives in these two cases. In one case, Clinton administration officials were directly involved in setting up the meetings that led to the Apparel Industry Partnership, and then creating a grant that could fund this type of initiative. Gov-ernment support for forest certification was generally less direct and took the form of funding rather than personal leadership.
Second, although the construction of both types of certification systems was a conflictual process, the environmental social movement field tended to be more cohesive than the field of labor and human rights groups. For instance, there were serious debates between groups that supported tropical timber boycotts, like Friends of the Earth and the Rainforest Action Network, and more mainstream environmental groups that opposed boycotts, like WWF; nevertheless, the former groups sometimes used boycotts in ways that served to increase participation in the timber certification partnerships led by WWF-a tacit alliance of sorts between different segments of the environmental community. 110 By contrast, intense frictions between organized labor, some labor rights groups, and mainstream human rights organizations dominated the early days of labor standards certification, especially once labor unions dropped out of the emerging FLA in protest of its lax standards and procedures. Furthermore, because of the "mainstreaming" of environmental concerns and the creation of "environmental management" positions and consultants in the corporate sector, actors working on forest certification have been more likely to move between the business and NGO sectors than have actors working on labor standards certification. So while both labor and environmental social movement groups used similar tactics of targeting companies, the two movements differed in other ways-some of which may be consequential for the future of certification.
Third, although both forms of certification arose in the 1990s, forest certification did begin somewhat earlier than labor standards certification. Because of this, it is conceivable that the institutional entrepreneurs on the labor side may have drawn on or copied from forest certification as a model for their own work. Yet my interviews indicate that channels of communication between these two groups were almost completely absent. Many key players in building either forest certification or labor standards certification knew very little about the other case of certification, and some indicated they would like to learn more from me about how other attempts at certification have worked.
111 So although there is a difference in timing, it is unlikely that this greatly affected the process by which private regulatory programs emerged.
CONCLUSION
Why did the same regulatory form emerge in two otherwise quite different fields in the 1990s? The answer is that the fields experienced roughly similar dynamics of controversy, conflict, and innovation, resulting from a particular type of social movement strategy and a neo-liberal institutional context. Social movement campaigns that targeted companies for their labor or forestry practices led to spiraling debates about the credibility of corporate claims to social and environmental responsibility. A neo-liberal institutional context encouraged states and NGOs to build private regulatory associations, by limiting opportunities for governmental and intergovernmental regulation. In this context, states offered support for private regulatory initiatives, sometimes after being constrained in attempts to develop governmental or intergovernmental solutions. Ironically, then, public agencies are in large part responsible for the rise of private regulation. NGOs also played crucial roles in building the first certification initiatives in each field. Yet they did so primarily after they had experienced repeated defeats and failures in intergovernmental arenas, particularly as the governmental action on environmental and/or labor standards they had been campaigning for became increasingly defined as "non-tariff barriers to trade." To be clear, it is a neo-liberal institutional context that explains why certification has emerged in the form of private rather than governmental or intergovernmental systems. The battles about claims-making and credibility discussed above could have been addressed through public institutions, had international institutional arrangements not discouraged this outcome.
My analysis has identified two types of mechanisms driving the rise of private regulation-one about social movements, the other about free trade rules and regimes. In addition, the analysis has shed light on the process by which certification associations emerged, by looking carefully at how strategies unfolded over time and the ways in which specific events helped mobilize moral and material support for certification. While I have focused on explaining the apparel and forest products cases, the analysis has uncovered a story that is potentially generalizable to other settings, given several conditions. If social movement pressure exists and is directed at companies that place value on their brand reputations, and if commodity chains in the industry are heavily international in scope, then I would expect processes in these fields to look similar to the apparel and forest products fields. Specifically, I would expect social movement campaigns and industry responses to generate demand for some overarching system to evaluate company claims. When international trade is involved, then institutional arrangements for securing free trade will mitigate against governments doing this directly, and we are more likely to see governments and other interested parties supporting private certification associations. On the other hand, certification can be carried out through governmental means, where intranational trade is more prominent. 112 As the research literature in this area advances and expands, additional research will be able to see if these mechanisms help explain the conditions under which private certification associations are likely to materialize.
More broadly, what can the cases analyzed here contribute to our understanding of how new regulatory forms and institutional arrangements emerge? First, my analysis points to the intersection of globalization and institutional emergence as an important area for theoretical elaboration. Over the past century, social scientists have shown quite decisively that institutions matter-that is, that market activity is embedded in and depends on particular institutional arrangements. 113 But our theories of institutional emergence and change often assume a context in which production networks are primarily national in scope, firms are clearly bounded, and nation-states stand as the ultimate arbiter of rights and rules. These baseline conditions seem to be changing. Scholars from a variety of camps have argued that globalization disrupts existing institutions, alters the power of states, and gives rise to new forms of governance. 114 In addition to the effects of hypermobile capital, capitalist globalization has also meant the rise of institutions for defining and securing "free trade." 115 As my analysis illustrates, these institutions of globalization can have far-reaching implications for other institution-building projects.
Finally, this study tells a story about what can happen when social movements' "corporate campaign" strategies collide with corporations' "branding" strategies. As I have shown, once social movements attack companies and companies respond with claims about their social/environmental friendliness, the movementcompany interaction tends to take on the character of a spiraling debate over the credibility of claims on both sides. An interesting sort of politics of legitimacy and information ensues, along with pressures for institutions that can generate credibility and impersonal trust. 116 This dynamic is especially likely to take hold when companies have invested in creating brand images that are cognitively and emotionally significant in the minds of consumers and investors-and thus worth defending in the media and public arena. As social movements increasingly target companies-rather than or in addition to governments-and brands become sites of cultural and political struggle, 117 it may add a new layer to the politics of regulation in the twenty-first century.
NOTES
